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In this episode, we look at the basics of war-economics, industry conversion, and try to understand why 'short wars' are so hard to win between peer opponents, once the economic struggle begins in earnest.

While tanks and fighters tend to win public attention, the fighting in Ukraine has done a lot to remind us of the critical role played by the infantry. And to survive and thrive on the battlefield, the infantry in Ukraine rely on their armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to enable to enable movement and provide fire support. Those vehicles, so critical to both sides have, however, been lost in extreme numbers - with no vehicle on the Russian side having suffered more visually confirmed losses than the BMP-2. Now, it seems, the floodgates are opening on the supply of Western IFVs to Ukraine. In this video I look at these vehicles, their employment in Ukraine, and suggest that despite being lost in large numbers - that they will remain critical in the fighting to come.

Militaries, like any organisation, share a basic vulnerability - they're made up of people. And wherever there are people, there is an organisational culture. Culture can shape the way a military performs just as much as the capabilities of its weapons or the count of its personnel. Having all the tanks in the world only means so much if the system maintaining them is weakened by corruption and false reporting - factors we've explored before. But there's a third part of this story, the component that helps explain why systems adopt inefficient structures, struggle to coordinate or become filled with mutual distrust and self sabotage. Politics. Where the political interests of individuals deviate from the interests of the collective, bad things happen, and where leaders begin to put more focus on loyalty than on competence, then a system will never live up to its full potential. This episode serves as the third episode in the trilogy that began with "How corruption destroys armies"

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed significant issues with Russian planning, force structure and military culture. On this channel I've spent the better part of a year exploring some of those issues and helping to explain why, as suggested back in March 2022, this was (and is) a much closer war many analysts expected. But it is equally important not to underestimate Russian strengths and capabilities. From information warfare to ammunition production and mobilisation potential, Russia has a suite of resources and capabilities that it can leverage. Following a popular vote, in this episode I look at Russian military performance and capabilities in Ukraine, and why I believe it remains a major threat for Ukraine in 2023.

Last week I talked about the enduring strengths of the Russian armed forces and their ability to launch offensives and apply pressure in Ukraine. Faced with that pressure, Ukraine's ability to carry on the fight will be driven not just by its own determination, but by the flow of weapons and assistance from its allies abroad. Aid to Ukraine has evolved dramatically since February 2022, and there are few topics that have attracted more constant press coverage away from the battlefield itself. So today I try and set out how aid has evolved, who the major contributors are, and the impact aid has had - and may have in 2023.

While the news often focuses on the role of large, expensive systems in the Ukraine war (think of the attention given to tanks, aircraft, or MLRS and SAM systems in recent weeks and months) some of the most omnipresent and disruptive systems have actually been terrifyingly cheap and accessible. Off-the-shelf commercial drones converted for military use have been deployed by the truckload, while some of Russia's more successful weapons have been comparatively cheap loitering munitions and kamikaze drones like the Iranian Shahed and Russian Lancet. Videos of equipment destroyed by drones that might cost a thousandth of the price have become image of the war across social media. In this video, I examine the use of these (often civilian) systems in the war in Ukraine, look at international developments, and ask what lessons we can take from the terrifying rise of cheap sensor and cheaper precision on the battlefield.

After a year of hard fighting there are a rush of observers trying to make sense of the current balance of power in Ukraine. The focus in often on (often small) movements in the frontlines, casualties, or the performance of particular platforms and systems. Those things matter, but wars are not generally fought to take individual trenches or solely to inflict casualties. They are fought for strategic objectives. In this episode I dig into Russia's history of Empire, its modern strategic objectives, and try to assess whether or not the war in Ukraine represents a success or failure by Russia's own chosen metrics (as far as they can be determined). My suggestion is that in repeating a number of the mistakes previously made by leaders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, it can be argued that Putin has already condemned the Russian federation to a strategic reverse.

Much of the the defence content online focuses on what might be called major power competition and the cutting edge platforms that go with it. We often focus on the race by major military powers to field the latest and greatest expensive jets, ships, or submarines in quantity - and it's often those systems that capture the imagination But all those things have something in common - they cost immense amounts of money, and for most nations, keeping up with the USAF or the shipbuilding efforts of the PRC just isn't on the cards. So following a vote by my patrons I decided to look at the question of how smaller (both in terms of population and/or economic power) nations can try to defend themselves in a world dominated by larger powers.

For centuries, leaders often depended on bands of mercenary warriors to make up their military strength in times of war, but as national militaries evolved, these formations shank from prominence, with modern PMCs generally being focused on support roles like base or VIP security or logistics (even if their contracts grew massively post 2001). Wagner doesn't follow that example. A force tens of thousands strong, Wagner has helped spearhead the Russian offensives around Bakhmut, and taken on international prominence. In this episode, I look at the evolution of PMCs, Russia's modern employment of them, and the implications of Wagner's role in Ukraine and its public spats with the Russian MoD.

Over the last year, the Ukraine war has played out both on the battlefields of Ukraine, and on global markets where energy warfare, sanctions, and industrial mobilisation efforts went head to head. Russia wanted to freeze Europe, while the Western allies sought to strangle the Russian economy with sanctions. A year on - I want to look at how successful these competing economic campaigns have been. Setting the stage to look at battlefield developments, attrition, and force regeneration in the near future.

The Russian invasion of 2022 began with a multi-pronged winter invasion of Ukrainian territory. After a series of reverses in late 2022, the Russian effort to reclaim the initiative in Ukraine seems to have begun...with another multi-pronged winter offensive. In this episode, I look at the way that offensive has played out, what observations and lessons might come out of the last three months, and what that may mean for the war to come. Also we're going to talk about the shovels story, because we have to do better than that.

Territory may be the most commonly used barometer for assessing the success or failure of the winter campaign, but just as important is the impact of the fighting on the forces. Attrition is intrinsically linked to war, as men and equipment are ground down by the effort and by enemy action. In this episode we look at loss estimates, discuss the challenges of attrition, and update on the efforts of both sides to make up losses and generate new offensive potential.

Before the war, the Russian Government had poured significant sums into the modernisation of its air-force, acquiring hundreds of new aircraft, deploying new weapon systems and testing the force over Syria. In Ukraine, the VKS has found itself as the stronger party, but none the less held off by Ukrainian air defences and fighters and incapable of delivering decisive support for ground forces. In this episode we look at the air war (building on previous discussions of ground based air defences and helicopters) and also at one of the most contentious issues for Western nations supporting Ukraine - whether UA needs (and should receive) Western built aircraft.

From the time NATO was founded in 1949 to the recent accession of Finland, the United States has remained the foremost military power in NATO. But a question that is not often asked is why? Why would a power like the USA continue to expand promises of defence to an ever larger group of nations that cannot hope to offer a similar level of capability or assistance in return. The acceptance of new allies into NATO or bilateral and multilateral security treaties has not always been without domestic and international opposition. And so today I wanted to follow up on my video on Russian grand strategy, with its baked in goal of undermining American influence and global leadership, with an examination of America's published security strategy, the role alliances and coalitions play in it, and some of the theory behind why the argument can be made that the basis of American global influence and its privileged security position owe as much to its alliances and coalitions as to other aspects

Often we think of war and peace as binary states - one is either at war or at peace. But history is full of examples of the line between those two states being blurred, and in a modern world of nuclear weapons and globalised economic and military competition, that competitive state between war and peace has grown particularly prominent. When Russia overtook Crimea in 2014 with its "little green men" the world got a high visibility view of what a hybrid war, combining information warfare, unconventional methods and conventional military force might look like. Today, I want to give an overview of hybrid war methods, their potential, and potential defences against them.

Japan's culture of pacifism is rooted in the nation's post-war experience and the restrictions on its rights and ability to wage war set out in Article 9 of its post-war constitution. But Japan's economy is deeply dependent on the global security situation, and with rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the shock of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine Japan's plans have undergone a sudden transformation. Old taboos about long range weapons have dropped away, and a huge influx of spending aimed at overhauling JSDF capabilities is now being planned. There is no change to Japan's constitution, and Japan's cultural and legal restrictions on the use of force remain deeply entrenched - but the capabilities of the JSDF are likely to change. In this video, I look at Japan's strategic position and the present strength of the JSDF, unpack Japan's 2022 defence strategy, and what impact it may have on both Japan's capabilities going forward.

Besides atomic ordnance, perhaps no weapon system commands public and media attention like hypersonics. No other weapon, when used in Ukraine, is basically guaranteed to command a news cycle. And yet their importance is hotly debated. There are those who argue the US has fallen behind in an absolutely critical field of military technology - and likewise others who argue the entire class of systems represent an overhyped waste of money. In this episode I try and provide at least an introduction to that multi-billion dollar question...

The much expected Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive (sequel to the well known trilogy in 2022 "Kyiv" "Kharkiv" & "Kherson") has, alongside Bakhmut, been a major topic of speculation and discussion for months now. As a topic it is so heavily debated that there isn't even agreement over whether or not it has started, is yet to start, or will never start at all. For the most part, while some preparations are obvious, Ukraine has succeeded in keeping its actual plans secret, and even a leak of classified American documents did little to definitively answer the question of where and when Kyiv is likely to strike to attempt to reclaim the initiative after Russia's Winter and early Spring efforts. By popular request, today we take a chance to look at how we got to this point - how have both sides prepared for the offensive to come, what military actions are presaging it, and what it might mean for the war over the next few months.

Given the storm of email I got after posting that video, I feel confident saying that there may be a strong perception on the internet that France is a nation lacking in serious military heft, both now and historically. The reality is that France has long been one of Europe's major military powers, and while no longer the great power it was before WW1, France remains nearly unique among European States for a number of reasons, ranging from being the only Nuclear armed EU state, to being one of the few nations around the world with the ability to meaningfully project power internationally, supported by carrier aviation. In this video I look at the French military and military industry as they currently stand, but also at what Paris' future plans tell us about the way the French military (and economy) are likely to evolve in response to the war in Ukraine and rising international tensions.

The first computer predates the first hacking attack, the first aircraft were not armed, and the first satellites were blissfully immune to any targeting or attack. But humans are humans, and if there's a target to hit, sooner or later militaries will try to find a way to hit it. And where a domain becomes particularly valuable (in the way space has becomes) it makes sense that it will not remain immune to attack forever. In this episode I begin what I hope is a miniseries (to be spread out over time) on war as a domain for competition and, potentially, warfighting. I look today specifically at the basics of space combat, and some of the tools available to nations who want to take the fight to an opponent's space-based capabilities.

Frontlines in Ukraine often move only slowly - but that does not mean the war is being fiercely fought day by day. Often this takes the form not of territory taken, but of exchanges of fire either over the frontlines or, critically, against operationally or strategic targets behind the lines. For nearly a year, Ukraine relied primarily on HIMARS and M270 to counterbalance Russia's advantage in longer ranged weapon systems, but successive Russian defensive adaptations (including pushing targets out beyond GMLRS range) mean that these systems are not always viable answers to Ukraine's pressing military needs. The arrival of British Storm Shadow missiles presents a step change in Ukraine's long range capabilities. Today I look at how that aspect of the war has evolved, the significance of the Storm Shadow system, and how Ukraine's allies are steadily building its ability to fight at Operational ranges using this and other systems. In that context it becomes clear that Storm Shadow is

While not taking away from the immense sacrifices and efforts of the the involved forces, allied aid to Ukraine has been one of the decisive factors in the war so far. Ukraine has constantly sought new capabilities, while Russian media and politicians have often tried to stoke fears and warn against taking any additional steps.

Army artillery and missile systems have been some of the most critical weapons of the war in Ukraine. Traditionally the US military has relied heavily on air assets to deliver heavy fires at very long ranges, with army artillery and missile units doing their best work in comparatively closer. But on a massively networked battlefield, and with allies and competitors rushing to field longer-ranged army missile systems, the US army is now pushing ahead with a massive modernisation program to extend its reach. This episode asks how the US army fell behind in range, whether that matters, and what they plan to do about it.

Long before equipment reaches the front, it must first be ordered, designed, produced and fielded. This is a process that nations have been going through for centuries. That doesn't mean they're always good at it. With every year that passes it seems that military equipment becomes more expensive, delivery schedules blow out more, and failures mount. Sometimes the answer may be corruption - but sometimes it's just a case of mistakes being made and things going wrong. In this video I want to have a look at some reasons why...

Most observers (Western and Russian) seem to have expected Ukraine to go over onto the offensive sometime in the 2023 campaign season. Such a move was well telegraphed and a natural extension of Ukraine's stated objectives of taking back occupied territories from the Russian Federation. By mid-June, it was clear Ukraine had started an offensive effort, launching probing actions at multiple points along the front and finally showing some of the heavy Western equipment it had received over the last six months. Those initial attacks ran into the teeth of heavy Russian defences, and progress since then has been slower than the Ukrainian High Command may have hoped. Initially I had planned not to touch these developments for some time - but with the recent information environment extending the full range of takes from 'Ukraine has lost the war' to 'everything is according to plan' I thought it was worth making an effort to try and clearly interpret (as far as possible) the data as we

The Wagner mutiny of late June is likely one of the more dramatic events of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2023, and one that caught many observers and the international audience off guard. Despite being closely watched by people around the world - much about the mutiny remains unknown - from its true purpose to the details of how and why it seemed to suddenly end. In this episode I look at what we know so far, ask what prospects the attempt had for success, what observations we can tentatively make, and what the impacts going forward might be.

We spend a lot of time on this channel focusing on how nations prepare for and fight wars - and comparatively little on the thinking that goes into bringing about their end - negotiated or otherwise. In this episode I take a bit of a break to talk about the theory behind deciding when and how nations might chose to end a war, the various ways in which they might chose to do it - and all the reasons that pure rationality is a pretty imperfect framework for predicting the behaviour of nations. Apologies for the late release, and I hope you all enjoy.

While systems like tanks, jets and cruise missiles tend to capture the public imagination, the war in Ukraine in 2023 is largely being fought with much the same tools as it was in 2022 - artillery. The constant exchange of fire has been critical to the battle, enabling attrition, blunting attacks and enabling advances. Both sides have continued to adapt, trying to refine their tactics and capabilities while wearing down their opponent. But in this attritional struggle, losses and resupply of systems, barrels and ammunition matter, not just tactics. Ukraine now finds itself in an ammunition deficit - trying to attack at a time where its allies have not yet ramped up production enough to readily meet its needs. It's in that context that the US recently announced the supply of cluster munitions to refill Ukraine's ammunition bunkers. Today we look at those munitions, their likely impact, as well as the broader course of the artillery war in Ukraine one year on from my original video o

Across other videos I've often hinted at the Republic of Korea as something of a military outlier. A major power that, at a time that other forces are battling a shortage of artillery, manpower or heavy equipment - still had all of the above at its disposal in serious quantities. Because whereas many other nations in places like Europe embraced the peace dividend of the 1990s, the ROK's strategic context remained complex and threatening - with North Korea's massive conventional (and now nuclear) arsenal constantly ready to resume a war that never officially ended. The ROK's defence strategy is a story of a nation having to make sacrifices and prioritise in order to contain and deter serious threats within the limits of the nation's limited resources. It's an interesting study in a major military for whom mass and artillery firepower remain key tools of deterrence and security - and it is likewise a story of a nation that has gone from a minor actor in the international arms market, t

While the hardest fighting in Ukraine takes place on land, the Black Sea front saw a stand-off through most of 2022 and early 2023. Russia's fleet was ranged away from the coast by AShMs, but continued to fire cruise missiles from afar. As time has gone on, the fighting has evolved and new weapons have been deployed, including long range drones. At the same time, the deal which allowed millions of tonnes of foodstuffs to safely transit the Black Sea now seems to have ended, setting the stage for a potential escalation in fighting and a potential blockade. In this episode, I look at the naval war in 2023, the strikes on the bridge, and the potentially vast implications of the end of the grain export deal.

Ankara's role during the war in Ukraine is a complex and sometimes controversial one. As a NATO member but not an EU state, the Turks have continued to expand their trade with Russia and have continued an open dialogue with Moscow. On the other hand, Türkiye's military industry has supplied Ukraine even before the full scale invasion and Turkish policy has been full throated in its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity - including Crimea. Turkish policy is complex and, to use the words of a former NATO assistant Secretary General - compartmentalised. It often involves cooperation even with potential strategic rivals, and sometimes tense and transactional interactions with general allies. In this episode I wanted to explore the nation's defence capabilities, economic and strategic situation, and see how that may have helped inform Erdogan's policy in Ukraine - and how that policy may impact the war going forward.

Usually on my channel we focus on questions of defence economics - elements like national resources, production, stockpiles and logistics that feed into the ability of a nation to carry on a war. But I also try to always flag the importance of political and social elements as well - the ways in which politics and the will to fight can complicate what would otherwise be a largely mathematical exercise. While those factors are important however, Russian politics is not my area of academic or professional focus. Today I'm releasing an interview recorded with Danish military analyst Anders Puck Nielsen at the Royal Danish Defence College. Anders has long had a focus on Russia and the Russian military, and so I was keen to get his thoughts on Russia's political and social divisions of power, attitudes towards the war, and how these might factor into Ukraine's theory of potential victory. All thoughts expressed are obviously his own personal ones (though all slide content was produced

2022 dramatically changed rhetoric around NATO's strategic position and the importance of conventional military deterrence and preparedness, particularly in Europe. While many politicians were quick to speak on the need to respond decisively to the new envioronment, both by aiding Ukraine and also building up domestic capability, there was an open question over whether the will and capacity was there to convert announcements into orders and deliveries. Today, we look at NATO defence spending estimates for 2023 to get an idea of what patterns are emerging, and ask how NATO is responding to the Russian challenge.

Over the course of the war in Ukraine, Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin and Wagner Group became household names around the world. From their fighting at Bakhmut, to their standoffs with the Russian MoD leadership, to the dramatic march on Moscow followed by a public truce, the PMC and its leader often dominated the news. But on 23 August, Prigozhin's story seems (so far) to have come to a very public end, when a jet carrying him and other Wagner members crashed in Russia with no reported survivors. What does that mean for the PMC, Russia, Africa & the West? Those are questions I'll ask today.

While the Ukrainian army has demonstrated that it's capable of fighting Russian forces on the ground, the air-war in Ukraine has always been far more asymmetric. In this episode we look at the changing nature of that war, including the emergence of behind-the-lines strikes, and the upcoming arrival of the much awaited F-16s for Ukraine's air force.

Why keep a base open if the military doesn't need it? Why pick a potentially second best product? Welcome to the world of incentives & interests in defence procurement. Budget and procurement decisions can shape militaries. They determine where troops are based, what equipment they use and a thousand other factors from their pay and compensation to how deep the reserve munitions stocks run in the event of war. Given that, you'd be forgiven for thinking that the process would be simple - with the absolute focus being on getting exactly the equipment and facilities needed at the best possible price. So why does it seem to go wrong so often? Sometimes the answer might be corruption or errors (we've talked about those before and will again in future), but sometimes the answer might be a little more complicated. Procurement decisions based not just on getting the best price and product, but also on a need to preserve industry competition, support local interests or maintain critical

The war in Ukraine is one of relentless attrition. While territory usually only changes hands extremely slowly, munitions and equipment and destroyed and consumed at prodigious rates in a fires-dominated slugging match. In that kind of struggle, the endurance of a military may owe a lot to the pipeline of replacement equipment that supports it. For Ukraine, that largely means looking into the details of foreign equipment provision and some Ukrainian domestic production. But for Russia, without as many allies to call on, one of the key factors is probably defence industrial output, a topic which is widely contested in news and propaganda. According to some sources, Russia produces enough equipment to overpower all of NATO alone, acording to those on the other extreme, it produces little of value or quality. In this episode, I try to dive into Russian data as well as battlefield loss observations to try and get an understanding of where the truth lies. Trying to understand how much e

We've previously talked about 6th Generation fighters on this channel ( • The Race for 6th Generation Fighters ... ) but when they take to the skies, they won't be doing so alone. Increasingly autonomous and capable unmanned combat aircraft are here, and they are going to change the way you build an air force. Forces around the world are talking about the immense possibilities of combining manned and unmanned systems together into a cohesive team. In this episode I discuss the concepts behind drone wingmen, some of the major development programs, and what they might mean for the future of air warfare.

The logistical challenges in Ukraine are not limited to supplying forces in the field, they also extend to the absolutely vital task of recovering and treating the wounded. In this episode we explore recent publications on battlefield threats, medical treatment, and innovations in Ukraine - and reflect on what lessons other nations observing the hard fighting there might be able to learn to better prepare themselves for potential future conflicts Adsense proceeds from this video will be donated to support medical care and training in Ukraine.

After more than four months of fighting, Ukraine's counteroffensive is grinding on. There have been none of the rapid mechanised advances many Ukrainian allies hoped for. Instead, there has been a hard, grinding assault intended to slowly break into, and eventually through, the main belt of Russian fixed defences. Today I want to look at the way the counteroffensive has evolved over time, what we've learned about Russian defences and tactics, and what all of that might mean as months of mud and winter cold grow ever closer.

Israeli Defence Force is arguably one of the more unique militaries around the world, combining a rapid mass mobilisation system with a strategy that prioritises a unique mix of offensive, defensive and industrial capabilities. Now, with Israel mobilising those reserves and declaring a state of war, the capabilities of the IDF have taken on particularly pressing geopolitical significance, and so I thought it was time to take a closer look at the force, as we have previously for nations like Japan and the Republic of Korea. In this video I look at the history of some major IDF operations, the development of Israeli strategy, doctrine, and capabilities and some initial observations arising out of the events of the last week. I do want to say however, that as noted in the video, most of this presentation was prepared before the events of the last week in Israel and Gaza. As a result, they focus on the IDF from a strategic and defence-industrial perspective with observations arising

Many weapon systems sent to Ukraine or deployed by Russia have been characterised by at least some commentators as potential "game changers." From Javelin to Lancet and the Leopard 2, many new systems have been introduced and/or scaled up in use over the course of the war, and some have entered in dramatic fashion (as with the recent ATACMS strikes). In this episode I review a sample of "game changer" systems, discuss how we might evaluate whether or not a system deserves the title, and figure out what each did, or didn't, do to change the war in Ukraine.

Since the second world war, the aircraft carrier has been a dominant symbol of naval might. Now however, the Aircraft carrier is facing a growing family of new and evolving threats, ranging from anti ship ballistic missiles and hypersonics, to more capable submarines and unmanned systems. Some argue that these threats mean the Carrier may be ready to go the way of the battleship, becoming obsolete. On the other hand, those same nations perfecting anti-carrier weapons are also investing extensively in new carriers of their own, suggesting they retain value. In this video I look at carrier evolution, fleets, roles, threats - and the potential future of these extremely expensive platforms.

Compared to many of the other militaries we’ve looked at, Iran’s force structure and overarching strategy stands out. From its arsenal of Shah era weapons to its new generation of missiles, in this episode we did a bit deeper into Iran’s military capabilities, limitations, and the industrial capabilities behind them.

A few weeks ago, I looked at some of the many systems that have been used in Ukraine that attracted their share of of media hype and asked whether they delivered on their hype. Today, I round out that list with more hyped up systems that didn't make in into the first video, while also looking at some that I'd probably nominate as just as, or more significant, that the ones drawing heaps of media attention. Expect a focus on the importance of context and opportunity costs as we look at Kizhal, SCALP, the TB-2 drone and Orlan drones, as well as Starlink and Russia's extensive park of EW assets. Thank you all of you who voted for this topic - I hope you enjoy.

Why are nations building nukes again? And do the ones they have actually work? The final years of the Cold War and the post-Soviet era that followed were a period of successive victories for efforts at nuclear stockpile reduction and disarmament. But in 2023, efforts at new arms control agreements appear dead in the water, and many nations are now either looking to replace old systems or, like China, expanding their arsenals beyond their present levels. In this episode, I look at nuclear modernisation, new delivery systems, and the industrial and financial challenges involved.

As we head into December, Ukraine is getting colder and the campaign friendly weather of mid-year is long gone. Despite that Russia has launched perhaps its largest offensive of 2023, targeting the salient around the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka - burning through armour and manpower in the face of a stubborn Ukrainian defence. At the same time, with it now clear Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia offensive will not reach its objectives this year, Ukraine has escalated its efforts on a different front, establishing several small bridgeheads across the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast. In this episode, I look at some of the key Ukrainian and Russian offensive efforts of late 2023, examine the data we have on losses and attrition, and ask what the fighting might tell us about the state of the forces involved, and the way this war is being fought.

It's increasingly understood that the war in Ukraine is likely to be a long and hard one - and in that kind of attrition based struggle, resources and political will can matter as much as battlefield victories or defeats. Today I cover the topic of war exhaustion, asking not whether each side has the physical resources to continue, but instead what the data says about the willingness of voters and leaders in Ukraine, Russia, and Ukraine's allies to stay the course and push on despite the costs of war - and what it may mean for the war in 2024.

Until recently, the comparatively small nation of Guyana didn't make global news particularly often. What was reported was generally a good news story - With oil discoveries and growing production driving rapid economic growth in the historically poor nation. Now the nation is in the global spotlight as with the escalation of a centuries old territorial dispute, and neighbouring Venezuela asserting an intention to incorporate more than two thirds of Guyana's current territory into Venezuela. Is the move simply domestically focused theatre, an attempt to pressure Guyana and the USA, or the prelude to a South American take on the 'Special Military Operation?' In this episode we discuss the nations involved, their motivations, resources, and try to ask why this is happening, and what may come next. One note: I want to feature up here I refer to Russia as an OPEC member as shorthand in this video. They are more accurately described as a member of OPEC+ .

How do you train an army to fight a war that is different from any you've ever experienced? Support for Ukraine has played a vital role in shaping the progress of the war in Ukraine to date. Ukrainian efforts have heavily leveraged munitions and systems supplied by their allies - but training has also been a key area for allied support Unlike weapon systems however, evaluating the performance of NATO's training efforts are harder to determine. Reporting tends to focus on the quantity of troops going through these programs, but less reporting focuses on whether the training properly matches the realities of the Ukrainian battlefield To get a better understanding of NATO's efforts to train with Ukraine in the years leading up to 2022 and since the full scale invasion, as well as some of the lessons members of the alliance might be learning from the war, today I'm welcoming back retired US Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. LTG Hodges (Ret.) is a former commander of US Army Europe and

When debates arise on what the worlds strongest militaries are, attention tends to focus on the United States, PRC, and the Russian Federation. Less often mentioned is India...and I think that's a massive oversight. With a rapidly growing economy, young demography, and a developing military industry, India's military evolution and strategy are likely to become ever more significant regional and global factors in the coming years. So today, let's talk about it