Perun

Well here is a video I never thought I'd make. In the lead up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, most observers stressed how one sided the matchup was. They compared tank numbers, aircraft numbers, and defence budgets, and bluntly came up with the idea that Ukraine must be doomed. Now, after a week of fighting, Russia has made advances, sure, but there is every sign that the invasion has been fifty times more of a clusterf*ck than they were expecting, and Ukrainian resistance is giving NATO's traditional rival a run for its money. Why? I'll leave the mil and ex-mil to comment on the strategy, operations, and tactics we've observed over the last week. But there's another part to all this, and that's that Russia may spend more on its military than Ukraine...but it also spends a bunch of that on blingy capabilities that have and now they're paying the price. They've got thousands of nukes, they've got battlecruisers, and next gen hypersonic missiles...but they have tanks missing

In any conflict, there are always going to be myths that emerge. Stop me if you've heard some version of this one over the last few weeks: "Russia isn't sending their best troops/equipment. They just sent in the conscripts first to soften the Ukrainians up. Any day now the real troops will go in with updated gear and you'll see!" No. Russian visually confirmed equipment losses paint a very clear picture and it's this: If anything, the better equipment and units are paying a disproportionately high price in this campaign to date. I am not saying Russians have been well trained or well supplied. I'm not saying that they haven't used conscripts. I'm not even saying that they haven't shown a disregard for casualties. All I'm saying is that there is no evidence that Russia is holding back it's best men or materiel. In this video, I look at the myth, the available evidence, and present sources you can use yourself.

The world has been slowly, quietly adjusting to the growing use of unmanned systems in warfare. From the spectre of Predators and Reapers stalking the mountains of Afghanistan during the war on terror, there's been a growing appreciation of what these systems can do, but it's always been coupled with the feeling that 'in a real war' they wouldn't be nearly as useful. Then the Bayraktar TB2 started blasting $25 million anti aircraft systems in Ukraine while Russian drones have played a seemingly important role spotting for precision guided artillery rounds. When an aircraft starts mowing down anti-air systems, you pay attention. In this presentation, I give an overview of what we've seen in terms of the usage of drones and loiter munitions in Ukraine, then I get on to what makes that effectiveness so damn scary...the fact that these things are cheap. Really cheap (at least by defence equipment standards). Compared to tanks, jets, and all the kind of traditional balance sheet plat

Before the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the popular narrative was that the Russian armoured and mechanised forces would cut a swathe through Ukraine in a matter of days. A few weeks into the war, that narrative has flipped 180 degrees, with memes about Russian tanks exploding, and the Javelin missile system as the saviour of Ukraine. So extreme has been the swing, that questions are again (aren't they always) being asked about whether tanks can survive on the modern battlefield. I'm going to disappoint today by not advocating that all tanks go to the scrapyard. Instead, I'm going to give a brief history of the evolution of ATGMs, examine the evidence from Ukraine, and conclude that while missiles and shoulder fired rocket seem to provide tremendous opportunities, especially for smaller nations, the tank's role isn't done. There are paths for future evolution for the tank, they're just likely to be expensive and require extensive investment.

For all the videos on the technical side of this conflict, the ATGMs, the MANPADS and the drones, I thought it was impossible to touch on the manpower side of this particular conflict. If you watch enough media, you'd be forgiven for thinking Ukraine is hopelessly outnumbered in this conflict by the great Russian bear. If they've held on, so the argument goes, it's through sheer grit and determination. The reality, I think, is that two sides are fighting very different wars. Russia, undertaking its "Special Military Operation" has focused on making up its numbers through the use of paramilitaries, allies, proxies, and mercenaries. The great bulk of Russian reservists, former conscripts, are so far staying at home.

There's no denying that the Ukraine-Russia war is, in part, an information war, and with the recent announcement that Russian forces would be withdrawing from the Kiev front, the propaganda has gone into high gear. Russia claims it's destroyed the Ukrainian army's ability to fight, and will now liberate the Donbass (as well as claiming that's all it ever wanted) Some, going to extremes the other way, see Ukrainian victory as imminent, and the Russian army as a broken force. While I want to get back to questions of defence economics and industry as quickly as possible, I wanted to address this topic from the recent poll before moving on. I'll include the disclaimer that this is a question I've actively avoided to date, because it's harder to quantify and assess than other questions, but hopefully you appreciate the approach I've taken. In the end, only one person knows the true scope of Russia's intentions, and I'm not Vladimir Putin.

So apparently hour long presentations on defence investment weren't dry enough, so I'm dusting off the Economics degree (strongly recommended when pairing with military or strategic studies) to ask the question of what the economic situation may be if this war drags on. Some are insisting sanctions are achieving nothing, and that Russia is well placed to outlast Ukraine. Others are convinced that Russia's war will grind to a halt under the weight of these sanctions. In this video, I look at some of the tactics Russia has been using to minimise the impact of sanctions, as well as the basic economic disparities between Russia and the Western powers backing Ukraine. Suffice to say, Russia is economically outmatched, but it has a variety of tools and strengths to leverage, including energy exports and a defence sector that has spent years moving towards self-reliance.

Continuing on from our look at the relative economic power of Russia as compared to Ukraine and its supporters in NATO, today I look a little more at the question of military equipment resupply specifically. I try to break down the scale of the Russian army's equipment reserve and contrast that with the way we have seen, and can expect to see, the resupply effort evolve on the Ukrainian side of this fight. I also look at the military industrial capability that sits behind these powers, and the role it might play in the event this conflict stretches to be a matter of months and years, rather than weeks. I want to stress that this video is not a prediction of a long war, I make no prediction on that point, it's just an attempt to continue looking at a question I have not seen covered in great depth - how might this war evolve if the conflict does go on.

In this video, I take a look at what Russia's been doing that has caused so much concern around the world, both in terms of demonstrating new weapons and issuing warnings and threats. Then I dive into Russian doctrine around nuclear weapons use, as well as the reality of the nuclear taboo, in order to determine how great the actual threat of Russian nuclear weapon use is. Finally, I talk a bit about what other nations can do if they're determined to avoid any breach of the nuclear taboo, and keep Russian warheads locked up in their storage bunkers where they belong. A caveat as always that I am not a nuclear strategist by trade, but there are a number of good talks and articles out there if you would like to know more. I come at this from the perspective of someone who has studied and written on cold war era.

In this video, I look at what the modern lend-lease Act actually does, assess its significance, and then focus on some of the lesser known, and altogether less dramatic mechanisms that are being used to authorise the ever growing flow of US money and weapons supporting Ukraine. I'm also rather proud I managed to get the video under 30 minutes. The side effect of that is that I do not have time to delve into each of the individual pieces of legislation discussed. My descriptions of how foreign military financing work for example are necessarily simplistic, but I've tried to make sure the basics of what you need to know are here.

This war has produced some truly interesting takes - so many that I'm already planning my next myth-busting video as we speak. But one recent one stood out as as both particularly strange, and also as a good opportunity to discuss a serious topic. Recently a number of media organisations ran stories suggesting that the shipment of American missiles to Ukraine were dangerously depleting American supplies to the point where urgent measures are necessary or American security would be threatened. So yes, I'm going to deal with the idea that sending Stingers to Ukraine is a danger to the USA, but I'm also going to talk about how deep American weapon stocks are, what it means to have your security threatened, and why America probably shouldn't rush to crash-manufacture Stingers just because they're finally using the ones that were in storage. Defence procurement decisions have lasting impacts, and while the decision to ramp up Javelin production is an obvious one, I think we should be wary

n this episode, I look at the history of Swedish and Finnish neutrality (and shift to non-alignment in the post cold war era), examine what these two nations would bring to NATO, and what that means for Europe, Russia, the USA, and global peace and security. I want to stress that while I talk about the relevance of these new NATO members in the context of certain military scenarios that have appeared on Russian TV, I don't believe any of those are at all likely. They're used because they help illustrate the point, and because when something appears on Russian TV, you can't argue that there's zero chance of that being on the Kremlin's bucket list. Also, because I'm aware the word is used differently around the world, please note that when I'm using the term 'liberal' in reference to the post-war order, I'm referring to the system of institutions, rules, and norms the victorious powers put in place after WW2 rather than any contemporary politics.

In this video, I try to take a somewhat light hearted look at how corruption in a military context can (and sometimes does) work, citing examples of actual cases and using hypotheticals to demonstrate the kinds of actions that can rot an institution from head to tail. For those of you in countries that face this problem, it should all seem a little familiar. Examples are taken from the sources listed below and I make no independent representations on the veracity of any claims. I don't know exactly how much is stolen from the Russian defence budget, I doubt anyone does. But what I can do, is help us understand how a nation capable of producing some of the most advanced defence equipment in the world would be running out of fuel on day 3, and be rolling out museum piece tanks less than three months into a major conflict.

In this video I try to give historical context to Poland's decision to throw its resources behind Ukraine and put focus on what this nation, with an economy nominally the size of New Jersey's (ppp-aside), has done to keep the Ukrainian army fighting while preserving the lives and wellbeing of millions of Ukrainian civilians.

n this video we look at the importance of infantry, even on a battlefield dominated by advanced vehicles and systems, examine the roots of the Russian deficit, and also have a look at how Russia is trying to get around this issue. In doing so, we're also going to tackle a number of myths and questions regarding Russian manpower in Ukraine. Ever wondered how Russia can apparently outnumber Ukraine in the Donbass despite Ukraine mobilising reservists or why people claim there are tends or hundreds of thousands of conscripts with WW2 equipment fighting for Russia? We're going to talk about the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, and try to answer some of those questions.

In this video I look at the sanctions measures that have been imposed, what impact they've had, and try to assess how well the Russian and Ukrainian economies are holding up, and what may be next in store as the fighting (and economic pressure) continues.

For weeks, the most requested topic from my Patrons and coming in by email to look at some of those claims, ranging from the wacky to the reasonable, and to cast a critical eye on the way the war has been covered in its first four months. At their request, I'm going to have a look at some of the various claims that have come up, and put forward comments on some of the most pervasive ones (especially those that were nominated multiple times). Because I'm trying to cover a lot of ground, don't expect the same level of deep-dive detail as normal, but hopefully we can have some fun with it.

In this video, I go through some history of how the Bundeswehr came to be so run down. I go after the myth that the Bundeswehr has been poorly funded (there's both a yes and no answer there) and go through some of the reasons I think Germany's planned 100 billion Euro equipment spend could go horribly wrong if proper reforms and plans aren't put in place.

In this video we explore the pre-war Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces, look at the way the artillery war has evolved to date, how logistics may impact the sustainability of both forces going forward, and what lessons forces around the world might (tentatively) take from the war so far, based on the information in the public domain.

Before February 24th, there probably weren't many Western commentators that would have bet on a post-soviet state of 9 million people taking on a significant strategic role in deciding the fate of Ukraine and European security. But these are strange times, and following a call in the comments of a previous video, I've decided to look at the current (and potential future) role of Belarus in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Russian troops advanced into Ukraine from Belarusian territory in February, speculation has been rife that Belarusian dictator Lukashenko would send his own troops into battle alongside his Russian allies. Practically ever week brings a new series of articles announcing new mobilisation efforts or exercises in Belarus, and a heighted threat to Ukraine's Northern border.

In this video I take a look at the rotary aviation side of the Ukrainian war (with a particular look at the Russian KA-52), try to piece together how the tactics have changed, try and explain some of the weirder things we've been seeing, and examine what the losses and challenges mean for the future of these aircraft.

In some of my earliest coverage of the Ukraine war, I noted that just comparing defence spending between countries was extremely difficult and not all budgets are created equal. Today following a Patron vote, I'm going to try and unpack that a little more by diving into the world of defence economics and production 101. In doing so, we're going to try and answer some questions. Why does America dominate the global arms market? How can a 5th generation fighter be cheaper than those decades older than it? And why do so many nations chose to buy in arms rather than build their own despite the fact it leaves them highly reliant on other countries?

In this video I look at that initial missile campaign, the way the campaign evolved subsequently, and what lessons other countries might take from the war to date. I also address the question of sustainability - is Russia running out of these precision munitions, and to what extent do their production facilities have the ability to compensate. One thing I do want to say as well, is that while I try and take a reasonably detached look at issues like this, I want to make clear that discussing the performance of these systems shouldn't take away from recalling the very real human impact of their use, particularly against civilian targets or in built up areas.

Previously, I've looked at the way in which Russian force design and political decision-making have left Russian forces with a surplus of heavy equipment, but an inadequate supply of quality infantry. Today, thanks to a Patron vote, I look at Ukraine's situation. There, the combination of volunteers, popular resistance, and compulsory mobilisation filled the ranks with hundreds of thousands of new troops - but where a shortage of equipment and training has prevented them from realising the true potential of a mobilised, committed nation at war.

I think it's fair to say that the days of Moscow being the hub of the world's second most powerful conventional military are at an end. Now, that power rests in Beijing. The PLA's budget is vastly larger than Russia's but a mere fraction of what the US spends. Despite that, China has gone through an incredibly rapid military modernisation over the last two decades, building new platforms and fielding new technologies so quickly that the gap between its capabilities and the USA has narrowed significantly. How? Today I look at the Chinese military budget, industry, and the wonders of purchasing power parity.

Throughout the cold war, the Soviet Union dominated as a supplier of arms to the world, rivaling, and sometimes exceeding the United States as a source of global arms exports. With the fall of the Union, the former Soviet arms industry struggled, but the Russian Federation steadily rebuilt its share of the global market, resting on a reputation as a reliable seller of 'rugged, reliable and affordable' weapons to those in the world without the diplomatic alignment, cash, or desire to purchase Western made equipment. By 2014, Russian arms exports started to suffer reverses, damaged by sanctions and being cut off from industrial integration with Ukraine. But the industry survived.

If one thing is clear after six months of fighting in Ukraine, it's that there is little chance of an imminent, overwhelming battlefield victory to end the war. Instead, the struggle has become (as expected) one of attrition and economics. A question of Russian economic resilience, matched against the will of Ukraine and its allies to carry on the fighting, and Europe's ability to endure rapid and deep cuts in the supply of Russian energy resources. In this 6 month update on the war, I focus not on the battlefield so much as the politics and economics of the war, and ask the question of how much pain is being inflicted, and if we should expect them to carry on in a way that winning a long war requires.

When we think of major naval powers, we usually think of the big players. The USA, the USSR/Russia & the PRC - but surprisingly enough, in recent times all of them have sold relatively few of their ships and submarines abroad. How can it be that major naval powers, with significant military shipbuilding capacity, find themselves in this position? Well thanks to the results of the recent topic votes here and on my Patreon, you get to spend the next 56 minutes finding out. Maximum possible credit to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for making their data freely and publicly available in easy to manipulate formats - it makes covering topics like these much, much easier by providing good, open-source data.

A few weeks ago the Ukraine war was one of attrition and grinding advances, with Russian attacks in the Donbass an Ukrainian actions in Kherson both running into heavy defensive operations. Then suddenly the Ukrainians launched their operation in Kharkiv Oblast, and within less than a fortnight, the Ukrainians would reclaim more territory than Russian forces had gained in months of bombardment and attrition-driven advances. The war in Ukraine began with desperate defensive operations by the Ukrainian armed forces and population. Russian forces ended the first days pushing on the Ukrainian capital as the Ukrainians called for anyone capable of holding a rifle to stand up to defend the capital.

Captured equipment has been a feature of human conflict going back to the point where one human stole another human's bashing rock. But normally there are limits on how much it can be used. Supplying, repairing, or training on captured hardware is usually a difficult thing - unless the enemy is using basically the same kit you are. The Russian invasion of Ukraine involves a contest between two sides using compatible (largely) Soviet or Post-Soviet kit, coupled with a Russian force that seems predisposed towards abandoning equipment to the enemy. The result is that Ukraine (supplied by its farmers in some cases) has made extensive use of captured kit (as have the Russian aligned proxies). This video looks at some of the data behind that captured kit, discusses some of the challenges involved in recovery and repair (thanks to a guest contribution by everyone's favourite US Officer, Nicholas Moran) and the strategic significance of all this stuff that's been recovered and reused.

For nearly seven months, the war in Ukraine was not really regarded as a genuine war by the Russian government. The fighting would be done not by a fully mobilised Russian force, but by regular units, mercenaries, and Donbass conscripts - Russia's own conscripts would stay at home. But after seven months the result of that complacency was a crushing shortage of manpower to feed Russian frontline units. Ukrainian mobilisation had made good manpower losses and allowed the formation of entirely new units - while the Russian regular army, still undoubtedly a powerful force, found itself overstretched and forced to trust sections of the front to proxies or Rosgvardia. The results of that policy were obvious during the Kharkiv offensive. Now, Russia has decided to double down and recommit to war. Announcing mobilisation, enacting stop-loss, and 'annexing' parts of Ukraine.

Last week we talked about Russian mobilisation and what it might mean for Russian force generation this year and next - and in particular, I noted the fact that it was possible that the problems were resolved and new combat power was generated. In order to assess what impact that may have on the course of the war though Winter and into 2023, it's important to consider the Ukrainian side of the equation. The Ukrainians have been clear on their ambitions for next year, and set out what they believe their force requirements to be. So the question becomes - what are those requirements and can they meet them. In this episode, I explore that question, augmented by excerpts from an interview with the former commander of the US Army in Europe - LTG Ben Hodges (Ret.)

The Russian Air Force began the war in Ukraine with a formidable inventory of combat aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) supported by an array of stand-off munitions and EWAR capabilities. In the opening hours, it seemed that those capabilities may be paying off, with paratroopers inserting at Hostomel without interception by Ukraine's integrated air defence system (IADS). At the same time, Russian columns were (seemingly incomprehensibly) being picked apart by slow moving TB-2 Drones. But things changed quickly, and since the stabilisation of the situation, the airspace over Ukraine has been contested. Aircraft fly low to avoid interception, while new threats periodically emerge to challenge the equilibrium. In this video I look at the impact of air-defence systems on the Ukraine war, and what lessons observers may be taking based on the available data.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the Ukrainian war as the unchallenged master of that body of water. Ukraine's own fleet was small and less modern, and the opening weeks of the war were dominated by news of the Russian fleet launching missile attacks and threatening naval landings that pinned down Ukrainian forces in Odessa. But when the Moskva sank, the pattern of naval activity changed dramatically. Now, the Russian fleet stays mostly away from the Ukrainian cost, nervous of missile, drone, and air threats posed by an opponent whose own navy is mostly neutralised. In this episode I look at the evolving war in the Black Sea, the evolution and role of the Russian navy there, the sinking of the Moskva - and what if any lessons foreign observers might be taking from the war at sea so far.

Throughout 2022, implied or explicit Russian military threats to Europe by Russian politicians or media figures have become so common as to be almost ubiquitous. In many ways, this is a continuation of long historical pattern dating back to the cold war, when much of Western Europe lived in fear that, at any moment, the Soviet army may come storming West with a phalanx of metal and manpower. For many European leaders, the assumption long was that only the USA could serve as a meaningful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Even with the end of the cold war, NATO wargames and academic papers alike have often modeled scenarios where Russian forces maul NATO opponents, occupying the Baltic States or Poland in short order, demanding an American response.

Over the last several months I've spent a great deal of time (and will spend more time) looking at the role that Ukraine's friends and allies have played in supporting its war-effort. This has included the provision of funds, weapons, humanitarian aid and the taking in of millions of Ukrainian refugees. Against the backdrop of that assistance, it's easy to paint Russia as entirely isolated, a pariah state without friends to turn to. While it may not have the allies that Ukraine does, that is obviously not entirely true. From Iranian drones to North Korean shells, there are signs that Russia is turning to friendly or allied powers for the tools it needs to carry on its war - and in this episode we look at those nations and what impact they've had so far...and may have in the future.

The performance of a military system is about more than the sum of its equipment, manpower, and training. Culture and practices are critical. The Russian army appears to suffer from serious cultural issues. Corruption is a key one, while the practice of making up obvious lies to cover up the real state of affairs (which everyone then goes along with) and telling the boss what they want to hear at all costs - those practices enable corruption to thrive, and seriously undermine battlefield decision making. In this episode, we look at the culture of deception in the Russian army, explore some of the common complaints, and discuss some ways it may (I am not a Kremlinologist) potentially impact or have impacted Russian decision making in Ukraine.

While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion centre on the battle for Kyiv and the reverses Russia suffered there, in the South, the Russian invasion was altogether more successful in its opening moves. Advancing from Crimea, the Russians rapidly secured a number of critical positions in the South of the country, including a regional capital on the right bank of the Dnipro, the city of Kherson. The fighting to take back Kherson would be some of the hardest for Ukrainian forces. They would face a number of high quality Russian units who were heavily dug in, and they would do it over unfavourable ground. The fighting would take months and claim many lines before the final Russian withdrawal in November.

Military modernisation is a complex task for any state. Individual system selection is usually based on competitive trials and an extensive review and evaluation process. Usually. Poland's plans are a little different - ordering what is basically an entire new army's worth of equipment (with more tanks than many other major European states combined) from the Republic of Korea without any sort of extended trials process. In this episode, I ask the question of why a country in Europe would suddenly buy 1,000 tanks and hundreds of artillery pieces from a country half way around the world without so much as a trials program for the tank.

The 2022 phase of the war in Ukraine began in the closing weeks of winter, with a February offensive rapidly coming to face the onset of mud and thawing conditions. Now, in December, Ukraine prepares for a full winter of full-scale, conventional conflict. Winter conditions are extremely demanding, both on manpower and materiel, and in this episode we look a little closer at what is involved in operating in cold weather conditions, how cold Ukraine gets, and how prepared both sides seem to be for the onset of their winter war.

In the opening months of the war, Russia's formidable arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles was directed against a wide array of targets, from ground based air defences to military bases and infrastructure. For more information on that stage of the campaign, please refer to my previous video on the subject. But since October, Russia has turned both these systems and its newly arrived Iranian drones on Ukraine's critical infrastructure instead, particularly its power grid, sending millions into rolling (or total) blackouts. These attacks have all the hallmarks of strategic bombing, an attempt to destroy the ability and will of a nation to resist by striking targets behind the lines. It seems reasonable to assume that Russia's focus has thus turned from using its best weapons to destroy military units, to coercing the population and Government of Ukraine to surrender.

For months now, a city with a pre-war population of 70,000 has been the focus of relentless artillery and infantry attacks by the Russian military and the "Wagner PMC." For many commentators, the attacks seem nonsensical. At a time when Russia is pivoting to defence just about everywhere else along the line, why keep pouring men and materiel into a city that simply doesn't have value relative to the effort expended trying to take it. In this video I zoom in on the battle for Bakhmut, and explore its history, implications, and some of what we have heard about the tactics there.

Taking a quick break from the horrors of trench war and artillery combat in Ukraine for a week, we instead try to gaze forward towards the 2030s and the future of air combat. Fighter jets are among the most expensive, complex platforms that any nation builds and maintains (losing out to submarines and warships mostly because of the scale of the latter). For years, the US was the undisputed leader in the fighter domain, having introduced the 5th Generation F-22 Raptor in 2005, while challengers like the SU-57 would have to wait until the 2020s (and rise to fame a little thanks to the new Topgun film).

In Ukraine, perhaps no weapon has caused more losses, or decided more engagements than the artillery. With contested airspace both side have turned to the big guns to support their operations - and both have consumed ammunition at a prodigious rate (albeit Russia many times faster than Ukraine). In this episode - I look at the question of production and supply and ask the question - are Russia or Ukraine going to run out of shells in 2023